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Lawrence's Penumbra
Andrew Koppelman t
Matthew Limon, a developmentally disabled man, had just
turned eighteen when he had oral sex with a developmentally
disabled boy who was a few weeks short of fifteen. Kansas's
general criminal sodomy law prohibits "sodomy with a child
who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age,"
without regard to consent, the age of the offender, or the sex of
the parties.' Had the encounter been heterosexual, the penalty
for this statutory rape would have been fairly mild. Kansas's
"Romeo and Juliet" law greatly reduces the penalties for young
people under nineteen who engage in consensual sexual activ-
ity with teenagers between fourteen and sixteen If that law
had applied, Limon would have received, at most, a sentence of
fifteen months. But because the "Romeo and Juliet" law ex-
pressly excludes homosexual activity, Limon was sentenced to
more than seventeen years in jail (206 months, to be precise),
five years of court supervision after his release, and classifica-
tion as a "sexual offender" for the rest of his life.'
t Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University.
Thanks to Marcia Lehr for research assistance, and to Carlos Ball, Bob Ben-
nett, Mary Anne Case, Richard Posner, and Marc Spindelman for helpful
comments. Special thanks to Justice Anthony Kennedy, who, when presented
with the thesis of this Article, declined to comment in the nicest possible way.
I'd have done the same thing were I he.
1. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(2) (1995).
2. The law also requires that the age difference be less than four years.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a) (Supp. 2002). The more specific "Romeo and
Juliet" statute controls whenever an activity is covered by both this law and
the general sodomy law. See State v. Williams, 829 P.2d 892, 897 (Kan. 1992).
3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638
(2003) (No. 02-583). The consequences of being classified as a sexual offender
are potentially severe. Under the Kansas Offender Registration Act, Limon
must register with the sheriff of any county in which he resides or is temporar-
ily domiciled. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4912 (1995). The information
required under the registration, in effect, becomes public information. As such,
it is available for inspection at the Sheriffs office and on any Internet Web site
sponsored by a Sheriffs department or the Kansas Bureau of Investigation.
For a first conviction, this registration provision remains in effect for ten years
after conviction or, if confined, for ten years after parole or release. Id. § 22-
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The U.S. Supreme Court vacated Limon's conviction and
remanded the case for reconsideration one day after it decided
Lawrence v. Texas,4 in which it invalidated Texas's sodomy law.
The Court indicated that the Limon case should be given "fur-
ther consideration in light of Lawrence,"' but did not explain
further.
The relevance of Lawrence is not obvious. The statute chal-
lenged in Lawrence criminalized all homosexual sex. The Court
struck it down as an improper infringement on personal liberty.
The Court held that the statute "furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual,"6 but it did not say whether the
basis of its holding was the weakness of the state's interest, the
degree of intrusion, or some combination of these. It is not clear
whether the Court applied strict scrutiny, minimal scrutiny, or
something in between. It is most obscure which future cases
will be affected by the holding of Lawrence.7
Nonetheless, the appellate decision upholding Limon's con-
viction makes it clear that a remand is necessary. When pre-
sented with a claim that Limon's treatment violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the Kansas Court of Appeals concluded that
the claim was foreclosed by Bowers v. Hardwick," which had re-
jected a privacy-based challenge to a law prohibiting sodomy.
The impact of Bowers on our case is obvious. The United States Su-
preme Court does not recognize homosexual behavior to be in a pro-
4906(a)(1) (1995 & Supp. 2002). Upon a second or subsequent conviction, the
statute requires registration for the rest of the offender's lifetime. Id. § 22-
4906.
4. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
5. Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003) (mem.).
6. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. Mary Anne Case has observed that the
word "which" in this sentence signals that the following clause is
nonrestrictive, and that nonrestrictive clauses do not define the antecedent
noun. Thus, one could end the sentence with a period after "interest" without
changing its meaning. The meaning would be different if the Court used "that"
instead of "which." Mary Anne Case, Of This and That in Lawrence v. Texas,
2004 Sup. CT. REV. (forthcoming). This is technically correct, but it is far from
clear that the Court was conscious of the distinction between "which" and
"that" or meant its word choice to signal that the weakness of the state's inter-
est was doing all the work in its reasoning.
7. When the reasoning of Lawrence is scrutinized by a trained logician,
the consequences are not pretty. See, e.g., Richard D. Mohr, The Shag-a-delic
Supreme Court: "Anal Sex," "Mystery," "Destiny," and the "Transcendent" in
Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 363 (2004).
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003).
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tected class requiring strict scrutiny of any statutes restricting it.
Therefore, there is no denial of equal protection when that behavior is
criminalized or treated differently, at least under an equal protection
analysis. 9
Whatever the merits of this interpretation of Bowers v.
Hardwick,'° it was indispensable to the court's disposal of Li-
mon's equal protection claim. Lawrence overruled Hardwick,
depriving the court of appeals's reasoning of a key underpin-
ning. Thus, remand was necessary.
Beyond this, however, it is not clear that Limon should get
any comfort from Lawrence. There are plenty of reasons why
the state could rationally treat homosexual sex differently from
heterosexual sex. It could think that there is a moral difference
between the two activities. It could think that the stigma at-
tached to one activity is greater than that attached to the other,
so that it is a graver thing to induce a teenager to have homo-
sexual sex than to have heterosexual sex. There are plenty of
bases on which the court could affirm Limon's conviction on
remand.
Is there anything in Lawrence that helps Limon? Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion was careful to limit the reach of its
holding, and some of the opinion's language suggests that it has
no relevance whatever to Limon's case. The opinion indicated
that Lawrence should be resolved "by determining whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct
in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."1' The Court
determined that certain sexual privacies were protected, but it
emphasized that "[t]he petitioners were adults at the time of
the alleged offense," 2 and later emphasized that "[t]he present
case does not involve minors." 3 The Court obviously did not in-
tend to call into question the constitutionality of statutory rape
laws. The Court also limited its holding in other ways, by con-
spicuously ignoring legal arguments that were stronger and
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 12 a, Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct.
2638 (2003) (No. 02-583) (including a copy of the unpublished decision, Kansas
v. Limon, No. 85,898 (Kan. App. Feb. 26, 2002)). Thanks to Mary Anne Case
for pointing out the importance of this passage.
10. It is actually a pretty poor interpretation and was repudiated in Law-
rence by Justice O'Connor, who was a member of the majority in Hardwick.
See infra note 40.
11. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2484.
11732004]
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more persuasive than the mushy right-to-liberty argument
(and which would have been very helpful to Limon), but which
would have proven too much. The Court did not hold that there
was anything wrong per se with classifications on the basis of
sexual orientation, much less that discrimination against gays
was constitutionally suspect under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the group is the object
of pervasive prejudice." Such a holding would probably have
invalidated the U.S. military's exclusion of gays. President Bill
Clinton ran into political disaster when he tried to take on the
military's policy, and the Supreme Court evidently has no de-
sire to start down that road.
Nor did the Court hold that discrimination against gay
people was an impermissible form of sex discrimination, 15 the
most powerful argument of all. If the state prosecutes Ricky be-
cause of his sexual activities with Fred, and does not take ac-
tion against Lucy for doing exactly the same things with Fred,
then Ricky is suffering legal disadvantage because of his sex.
16
14. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062
(1985); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1341-52 (9th Cir.
1988), affd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Pro-
tection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57
CAL. L. REV. 797, 816-27 (1984); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1297-1309 (1985).
15. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAw 53-71 (2002).
16. Neither the majority opinion nor O'Connor's concurrence mentioned
this argument, but Scalia thought he discerned it in O'Connor's reasoning. He
sought to rebut the claim that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which
held that laws against interracial marriage were racially discriminatory, was
relevant to gays' claims.
In Loving, however, we correctly applied heightened scrutiny, rather
than the usual rational-basis review, because the Virginia statute
was "designed to maintain White Supremacy." A racially discrimina-
tory purpose is always sufficient to subject a law to strict scrutiny,
even a facially neutral law that makes no mention of race. No purpose
to discriminate against men or women as a class can be gleaned from
the Texas law, so rational-basis review applies.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). This
reasoning misstates what the Court did in the miscegenation cases. In both
Loving, which discussed white supremacy, and its precursor, McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), which did not, the Court held that the statutes
classified on the basis of race and so were subject to strict scrutiny. If a law clas-
sifies by race on its face, then the challenger has no burden of proving a dis-
criminatory purpose. The same is true of sex-based classifications. See
1174
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In any prosecution under the Texas statute, the sex of the par-
ticipants is an element of the crime that the prosecutor must
prove. 17 This argument goes too far for the present Supreme
Court. It implies the legality of same-sex marriage, 18 an issue
that the Court clearly intends to avoid. 19
So here's the puzzle: Just what principle might Lawrence
stand for that was violated by the state in Limon? What ought
the Kansas courts to do on remand, and why?
The Lawrence Court quotes with approval Justice Ste-
vens's claim in his Hardwick dissent that "'the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a par-
ticular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for uphold-
ing a law prohibiting the practice."'2 ° The only evidence Stevens
cited, however, was the miscegenation laws, which were con-
demned by an entirely different constitutional principle. Nei-
ther he nor any other Justice intends, as Justice Scalia protests
in dissent, to invalidate "laws against bigamy, same-sex mar-
riage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, forni-
cation, bestiality, and obscenity."2' The Court is not saying that
morals laws are never permissible.
The Lawrence Court does not say that the state interest
KOPPELMAN, supra note 15, at 55-63.
17. Justice O'Connor writes that "Texas treats the same conduct differ-
ently based solely on the participants." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485
(O'Connor, J., concurring). This statement, however, is not accurate. She
should have written that Texas treats the same conduct differently based
solely on the sex of the participants. Thanks to Catharine MacKinnon for
pointing this out.
18. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 15, at 71. For a thoughtful alternate read-
ing of the sex discrimination argument, claiming that it need not go this far,
see Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation
Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 107 (2002). Clark's essay is one of the very few arti-
cles I've read that substantially improved my understanding of the sex dis-
crimination argument-and believe me, I've read everything. See generally
Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
19. "The present case.., does not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. For a similar reservation, see id. at
2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
21. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that all such laws are
now suspect). Justice Scalia also gets carried away here. Whatever he may
think of masturbation, no state has ever criminalized it. Masturbation is
unmentioned in RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO
AMERICA'S SEX LAWS (1996).
2004] 1175
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has no weight, but only that it lacks sufficient weight to justify
the burden it places on individual liberty.22 But if the Court is
saying that private conduct between consenting adults is al-
ways protected, most of the laws on Justice Scalia's list really
would be invalid. Prohibitions of adultery and fornication in-
trude on the personal and private life of individuals as much as
sodomy laws do.23
More helpful is the Court's reliance on Romer v. Evans24 to
hold that the precedent of Hardwick, which held sodomy unpro-
tected by the right to privacy, had "sustained serious erosion."25
Just how had Romer eroded Hardwick? The Court explained
that Romer had
invalidated an amendment to Colorado's constitution which named as
a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual
either by "orientation, conduct, practices or relationships," and de-
prived them of protection under state anti-discrimination laws. We
concluded that the provision was "born of animosity toward the class
of persons affected" and further that it had no rational relation to a
21legitimate governmental purpose.
There is no logical inconsistency between the two cases:
The burden on gays in Romer was extraordinary, while Hard-
wick involved a prohibition of conduct that imposed no pun-
ishment on persons who refrained from that conduct.2' The
Court held that Romer was, nonetheless, pertinent to Lawrence
because "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the
law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation
to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres."28
The Lawrence Court thus suggested that if a law has the
effect of encouraging prejudice against gay people, it will dimin-
ish the weight that is given to the state's purposes when the
Court balances those purposes against the burden the law im-
poses. This gives rise to a new puzzle: Why should that effect
matter in this way?
22. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 ("The Texas statute furthers no legiti-
mate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and pri-
vate life of the individual.").
23. Such laws are occasionally enforced. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra
note 21, at 98, 103.
24. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
25. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
26. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 624, 634).
27. The consistency of the two cases is argued further in KOPPELMAN, su-
pra note 15, at 6-34.
28. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
1176 [Vol 88:1171
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Even for African-Americans, the group that receives the
highest level of constitutional protection against discrimina-
tion, disparate impact without more does not state a constitu-
tional claim.29 Of course, the Court did not hold that laws that
stigmatize and discriminate against gays are subject to height-
ened scrutiny. All criminal laws stigmatize and encourage dis-
crimination against those who violate them. For example, dis-
crimination in the granting of student loans against those who
violate drug laws is increasingly common.
On the other hand, the Court has said that under certain
circumstances, disparate impact can reveal an illicit motive.
"Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face." °
Moreover, the social meaning of laws can sometimes be rele-
vant to their constitutionality. The Texas statute's impact re-
veals something about its purpose. The fact that its audience
will understand it as an invitation to discriminate is evidence
that it was so intended.' And while it is logically possible for
persons to discriminate against gays on moral grounds without
any animosity toward them, this is a poor description of how
antigay prejudice actually operates in the contemporary United
States.32
Lawrence is full of language that demonstrates the Court's
concern with the subordination of gays as a group, rather than
just the liberty of individuals. At issue is the ability of gays to
"retain their dignity as free persons."33 Hardwick must be over-
ruled because "[i]ts continuance as precedent demeans the lives
of homosexual persons."3" If any sodomy law remains on the
books, "its stigma might remain" even if it is unenforceable.35
Gay people are entitled to "respect for their private lives ."36 The
state must not "demean their existence or control their des-
tiny.",
7
29. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
30. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977).
31. See Andrew Koppelman, On the Moral Foundations of Legal Expres-
sivism, 60 MD. L. REV. 777, 779 n.12 (2001).
32. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 15, at 21-25.
33. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
34. Id. at 2482.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2484.
37. Id.
20041 1177
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The Court does not say that Lawrence is like Romer in that
it involves "a bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,"38 but that it is the most coherent implication of the
Lawrence opinion. Moreover, that language does appear in Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurrence.
Justice O'Connor would have invalidated the Texas law
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. She observed that "[w]hen a law exhibits such a desire to
harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more
searching form of rational basis review to strike down such
laws under the Equal Protection Clause."3 9 Quoting Romer, she
concludes that the Texas statute "'raise[s] the inevitable infer-
ence that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected."'4 ° The majority does not expressly
embrace Justice O'Connor's equal protection theory, but it does
declare it to be "a tenable argument."
41
Justice O'Connor's reasoning explains what is left mysteri-
ous by the majority opinion: why the state interest is deemed
38. United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973),
quoted in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 2486 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 620, 634 (1996)). Jus-
tice O'Connor declined to overrule Hardwick. She observed that Hardwick did
not reach the equal protection question. Id. at 2486. She thereby undermined
the reasoning of every court of appeals that had addressed the issue, because
they had all regarded the equal protection issue as controlled by Hardwick.
See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571
(9th Cir. 1990); ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 640-41 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). That reasoning, always ridicu-
lous, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 15, at 30-31, should now be laid to rest.
"Three minutes' thought would suffice to find this out; but thought is irksome
and three minutes is a long time." A.E. HOUSMAN, From the Prefaces: Juvenal,
in SELECTED PROSE 56 (John Carter ed., 1961).
The strangest part of Justice O'Connor's concurrence is her claim that "I
am confident, however, that so long as the Equal Protection Clause requires a
sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals.
and heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic
society." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This seems
oblivious to the majority opinion's observation that nine such laws, all of long
standing, were among those invalidated by the Court's decision. Id. at 2481.
Perhaps Justice O'Connor is imagining a situation in which the law is vigor-
ously enforced against people of all sexual orientations. Sodomy laws, of
course, do most of their damage without being enforced at all. See Christopher
R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy
Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000).
41. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
1178 [Vol 88:1171
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insufficient to justify the burden on liberty here despite its suf-
ficiency in other cases where the law bans consensual conduct
between adults. In those cases, there is no reason to think that
there is animosity toward the persons affected, or a bare desire
to harm a politically unpopular group. The prejudice against
gay people evidently is what changes the equation in Law-
42
rence.
This reasoning, however, does not offer a clear principle
with which to decide future cases. The "bare desire to harm"
criterion seems even more malleable than the liberty interest
that the majority opinion purports to rely on. How does one de-
cide which unequal treatment is the result of hostility and
which has a rational basis?
The Limon remand suggests that what was done to Limon
might be on the impermissible side of the line. But if we stop
the analysis here, then the lower court has little guidance on
remand as to what "further consideration" it ought to give to
the case.
The trouble is that laws that discriminate against gays of-
ten both express moral disapproval and reflect a desire to harm
an unpopular group.43 If the analysis of Lawrence presented is
correct, the rule now seems to be that courts must determine,
on a case-by-case basis, the primary purpose of any such law.
This rule leaves plenty of room to cook the books when that
seems necessary to accommodate irresistible political forces.
The exclusion of gay people from the army largely rests on
primitive revulsion,4 and the refusal to recognize same-sex
marriage rests on similarly dubious motives;45 but the Court
does not need to admit any of this in order to uphold these ex-
clusions or, more likely, to refuse even to examine them.4 6
42. So why did no other Justice join Justice O'Connor's concurrence?
(Thanks to Mary Anne Case for posing this question.) I speculate that it is be-
cause she declined to overrule Hardwick and wanted to decide the case in a
narrow way that would not reach gender-neutral sodomy laws. No other Jus-
tice wanted to follow her to these conclusions, and it is not clear how they
could have easily separated out, and confined their joinders to, those strands
of her argument that were consistent with, or even necessary to, the reasoning
of the majority opinion.
43. See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 89 (1997).
44. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Gaze in the Military: A Response to
Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC L. REV. 179 (1995).
45. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL
EQUALITY 158-76 (1996).
46. Better to refuse to hear a case than to decide it wrongly. See Andrew
20041 1179
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In short, Lawrence can easily be denounced as poor judicial
craftsmanship. Its reasoning is obscure, and it lays down no
clear rule. As we have seen, however, the Court had very good
political reasons for avoiding transparency in both its reasoning
and its rule. If statesmanship is any important part of the judi-
cial craft, then Lawrence's level of craftsmanship may be quite
high.
This is not to say that Lawrence produces no rule of law at
all. Part of what troubled the Court in Lawrence was that sod-
omy laws singling out gays are a fairly recent development in
the law, only arising in the 1970s.47 Similarly, in Romer, the
Court was troubled that the challenged disqualification "is un-
precedented in our jurisprudence," and it declared that "[i]t is
not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this
sort."48 Extraordinary burdens, it appears, arouse suspicion.
Thus, the one clear rule that emerges from (but probably
does not exhaust) the fog of Lawrence, when considered in light
of Limon, is the following: If a state singles out gays for unpre-
cedentedly harsh treatment, the Court will presume that what is
going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than mere moral dis-
approval.
Traditional moralists will object that this presumption is
unfair. If one thinks that one's moral views are correct, chang-
ing circumstances may require that one pursue those moral
views through novel means. The novelty of the means, one
might reasonably argue, should not automatically entail a pre-
sumption of bad motive. Some contemporary antigay rules are
unprecedented, but the emergence of an active, widespread gay
rights movement is also unprecedented. A prohibition such as
the Texas law that singles out homosexual sex is one possible
response to that movement. The Texas law could be, and was,
supported by people of good will who do not question the equal
dignity of gay people.49
The answer is that every legal presumption that protects
some interest against the state has costs. It will surely impair
some legitimate government interest. A rule that the state may
not discriminate on the basis of race will sometimes prevent the
Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimi-
nation, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 163-64 (1988).
47. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
48. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
49. See, e.g., Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Self-
Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135 (1997).
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state from pursuing legitimate ends.5° A strong First Amend-
ment will protect some worthless and harmful speech."'
So, Lawrence should be enough to get Limon out of jail.52
The singling out of gay youth for such remarkably harsh treat-
ment would seem to pose a severe equal protection problem.
Kansas must treat same-sex and opposite-sex statutory rape on
equal terms. 3
The Kansas court would then face a statutory question
whether the "Romeo and Juliet" provision should be extended
to same-sex sodomy or whether it should be invalidated alto-
gether, even as to persons of opposite sex. People v. Liberta pre-
sented a similar problem.54 Liberta invalidated on equal protec-
tion grounds the spousal rape exemption to New York's rape
law.55 The Liberta court held that the legislature, if faced with
the choice, would probably extend the prohibition of rape to
married persons, rather than abolish the crime altogether, and
thus chose to leave intact that portion of the statute under
which the defendant was convicted.56
50. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99.
51. "[Ihf the state needs no stronger justification for dealing with speech
than it needs for dealing with other forms of conduct, then the principle of
freedom of speech is only an illusion." Frederick Schauer, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 8 (1982); see also George Kateb, The Freedom of
Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 220 (Ber-
nard Yack ed., 1996).
52. It should also constrict the ability of states to adopt choice of law rules
that entirely ignore same-sex civil unions that are valid in other states. Even
the Southern states during the Jim Crow era did not deal so harshly with in-
terracial marriages, which were as much an anathema to them as same-sex
marriages are to any state in the contemporary United States. See Andrew
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions After Lawrence v.
Texas, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
53. Since this Article was first drafted, the Court of Appeals of Kansas, on
remand, has upheld Limon's sentence. State v. Limon, 83 P.2d 229 (Kan. App.
2004). Its remarkable reasoning confirms that the statute is inexplicable ab-
sent animus toward gays. For example, the court argues that the state can ra-
tionally treat homosexual statutory rape more harshly than heterosexual
statutory rape because "[tihe survival of society requires a continuous replen-
ishment of its members," and "sexual acts between same-sex couples do not
lead to procreation on their own." Id. at 237. Evidently the statute can be de-
fended only by claiming, with a straight face, that statutory rape is less harm-
ful if the fourteen-year-old girl becomes pregnant. If this is the best rational
basis the court can come up with, then there is no rational basis. See id. at
243-49 (Pierron, J., dissenting).
54. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
55. Id. at 576-78.
56. Id. at 578.
2004] 1181
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The contrast with Liberta, however, is striking. In that
case, the state's interest in preserving the prohibition of rape
was easy to comprehend. "Statutes prohibiting such behavior
are of the utmost importance, and to declare such statutes a
nullity would have a disastrous effect on the public interest and
safety." 7 But what interest, other than a bare desire to harm,
would justify Kansas's subjection of its heterosexual young
adults to harsh criminal penalties, just to subject gay young
adults to the same penalties?
58
Lawrence, it appears, has a penumbra. There is a rule con-
tained therein that is not stated in the opinion, but that will
govern future cases. There are precedents for this kind of signal
from the Court. A week after it decided Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,'59 a case where the Court also faced considerable political
resistance, it similarly remanded a case involving the exclusion
of black people from opera performances in an amphitheater
leased from the state. 60 That case did not involve any issue that
was discussed in the Brown opinion, but it soon became clear
that the Brown Court meant more than it was saying.6'
57. Id.
58. The Court of Appeals of Kansas denies that there is severability, but it
does so tautologically, noting that severance would alter the statutory scheme.
See Limon, 83 P.3d at 240. Of course, severance always does that. "In deter-
mining whether the invalid portion of a statute may be severed from the valid
portion, the question is whether the legislature, if partial invalidity had been
foreseen, would have wished the statute to be enforced with the invalid part
excised or rejected altogether." NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 44:4, at 559-60 (6th ed. 2000). A law is not severable if "by
sustaining only a part of the statute, the purpose of the act is changed or al-
tered." Id. § 44:7, at 583. But absent gay exclusion, the Romeo and Juliet pro-
vision is "independent of the invalid portion and . . . form[s] a complete act
within itself," id. § 44:4, at 562-66, so severance would hardly "defeat the in-
tent of the legislature." Id. § 44:8, at 588. "There is . . . a presumption that a
legislative body generally intends its enactments to be severable, especially in
the case where it will preserve the constitutionality of the enactment." Id.
§ 44:3, at 556-57.
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per cu-
riam).
61. The Court, however, remained cryptic for some time. In a series of per
curiam decisions after Brown, the Court summarily affirmed lower court deci-
sions invalidating laws segregating public beaches and bathhouses, municipal
golf courses, a municipal bus system, courtroom seating, and public restau-
rants. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 681-82 (2d ed. 2002). The first of these courts reasoned that after
Brown,
it is obvious that racial segregation in recreational activities can no
longer be sustained as a proper exercise of the police power of the
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The broader upshot is that all antigay laws are now under
suspicion. The severest ones are unconstitutional. The courts
will not smash the great edifice of antigay law in the United
States with a single judicial blow, and it would be foolish for
them to try. But the edifice is crumbling.
State; for if that power cannot be invoked to sustain racial segrega-
tion in the schools, where attendance is compulsory and racial friction
may be apprehended from the enforced commingling of the races, it
cannot be sustained with respect to public beach and bathhouse facili-
ties, the use of which is entirely optional.
Dawson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (mem.). This interpretation is a pretty tortured reading of
Brown, which focused solely on the unequal educational results of segregation.
Presumably the patrons of the black beaches got just as wet as the patrons of
the white ones. See Lonesome v. Maxwell, 123 F.Supp. 193, 194-95 (D.C. Md.
1954), rev'd, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (noting earlier court finding and par-
ties' stipulation that Baltimore beach facilities were physically equal for both
races). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld this ruling and the following
cases without comment, until at last it cited the whole string of cases for the
proposition that "it is no longer open to question that a State may not consti-
tutionally require segregation of public facilities." Johnson v. Virginia, 373
U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam).
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